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Independent audits are the linchpin between a company's financial statements and their credibility with the investing
public. As such, the accuracy and transparency of this information is critical to the integrity of our U.S. capital
markets. However, in the wake of major corporate scandals, decades of consolidation, the dissolution of Arthur
Andersen and the introduction of sweeping regulatory changes, the transparency of independent audits, as well as
the future of our financial markets, may be at great risk.
According to the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) July 2003 Mandated Study on Consolidation and
Competition, the Big Four - Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers - audited 78
percent of all U.S. public companies, 99 percent of all public company sales and 97 percent of public companies
with sales of more than $250 million at that time.

With the Big Four stretched to capacity, many market participants started to question the current audit system and its
resistance against another accounting firm failure. Even America's largest organizations - 86 percent of the Fortune
1000 companies surveyed by the GAO - said they would prefer more than four audit firm choices.
Since the GAO study's release in 2003, more companies have begun looking outside the Big Four for audit service;
however, such findings still reinforce a false perception that there are no other audit firms capable of performing
independent audits besides the Big Four. The reality is that alternatives do exist for most public companies. There
are a number of qualified global, national, regional and local firms - each with different skill sets, market expertise
and geographic reach - are available to meet the varying needs of a diverse array of most public companies. By
effectively matching a company's size and needs with that of a compatible firm, companies would find the best
combination of quality, service, value and reach. U.S. markets would be protected by spreading risk among a greater
number of audit firms.

The independent audit's role in a changing accounting environment
For public companies, the independent audit serves as the foundation upon which their financial health rests.
Accordingly, it is no surprise that 61 percent of executives polled in Grant Thornton's Business Leaders Survey
believe that inaccuracy in this information would be a critical or very serious threat to their business - a larger
percentage than the threats from terrorism, a natural disaster, a stagnant economy, product recall or litigation.
However, as important as a financial statement is to the company it represents, the organization itself is not the only
party that depends upon the independent audit and its accuracy. Rather:
Investors rely on audited financial statements to build their portfolios
Analysts and rating agencies need audited statements to reach their assessments and evaluations
Contracts and agreements depend on audited financial results
Regulators need audited financial statements to do their jobs.
Simply put, without accurate audits, the entire capital markets system would be put in jeopardy - a fact that makes
recent changes in our accounting environment of notable importance. This shift began in the late 1980s when
accounting firm mergers reduced the number of large audit firms from eight to six. Nearly a decade later in 1997,
Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand merged to form PricewaterhouseCoopers, dropping that number to five to
create the world's largest accounting and consulting firm.
It looked as though the mega-merger trend would continue the following year with a proposed combination between
KPMG and Ernst & Young. However, the merger never took place. The head of KPMG Peat Marwick blamed the
collapse on regulatory and client issues.
The fact that the merger fell through only a few months after being hailed as the best way to serve global corporate
clients called into question whether mega mergers were, in fact, the best course for the industry. Regulators in the
United States, Europe and elsewhere feared that an Ernst-KPMG firm would dominate the audit market for clients in
certain industries and countries, resulting in greater conflicts of interest between the firms' auditing and consulting
units and higher audit prices for corporate clients.
At the turn of the 21st century came more unexpected changes in the accounting industry. After several years of
great prosperity, U.S. companies and investors watched as a number of very large corporations collapsed, one after
another, following some corporate scandals. From Enron to WorldCom to HealthSouth, these scandals seemed to
evolve almost overnight, devaluing the public's perception of the company and its industry, and weakening the U.S.
markets as a whole. And, alongside one of the greatest corporate falls of all - Enron - came that of Arthur Andersen,
one of the world's largest and most powerful accounting firms, making real what the Ernst & Young/KPMG merger
threatened years before.

With Andersen's collapse came more auditor concentration; according to the GAO, 87 percent of Andersen's more
than 1000 former audit clients switched to a Big Four firm. A new regulatory environment also emerged, as
Congress passed and President Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
Designed to restore public trust in U.S. corporations and markets, Sarbanes-Oxley made corporate governance no
longer just a good business practice, but the law. It focused on five principal areas of reform, as follows:
(1) expanded responsibilities for management, its board of directors and the audit committee;
(2) enhanced financial disclosures;
(3) reduced analyst conflicts of interest;
(4) expanded penalties for securities fraud; and
(5) creation of an independent Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as a division of the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
Appropriately implementing these changes proved challenging. Auditors suddenly found themselves struggling to
meet all of the legislation's demands in a less accommodating, less client/user-friendly and more labor-intensive
atmosphere. Finding the right answers often became more difficult than in the past, as companies quickly found that
audit questions previously resolved in a matter of hours now required days or even weeks as auditors' work was
checked and double-checked. This perceived decline in service - manifested in timing delays, unavailable staff,
increased cost and a much more sterile atmosphere - soon began to put a strain on auditor-client relationships.
Along with expanded auditor responsibilities, Sarbanes-Oxley also added another notable element to the audit
process; it mandated that corporate directors are legally responsible for appointing, compensating and overseeing
their external auditors. It was due in part to this requirement that skepticism of audit professionals increased; not
only as boards and audit committees began assessing their auditors' performance, but also as the media and
regulatory leaders began to voice their opinions regarding the current audit environment and its problems.
Among those expressing their concern was then PCAOB Chairman William McDonough. In an exit interview with
The Wall Street Journal published on 17 October 2005, he said that the PCAOB now encouraged issuers to "...really
look for an audit firm that makes sense for... them. There's been a sort of a notion that rating agencies and maybe
your lenders will think it's particularly spiffy if you're a small or medium sized company and you deal with a Big
Four firm. Frankly, I don't think that makes a whole lot of sense."
PCAOB member Kayla Gillan echoed these sentiments at the Association of Corporate Counsel annual meeting,
saying, "I urge audit committees to challenge the assumption that they must use a Big Four audit firm." Gillan
encouraged companies to consider one of the other 800 registered public company audit firms when deciding
whether to retain their current auditor or hire a new firm.
SEC Chairman Christopher Cox also raised concerns about the current state of the U.S. accounting profession at a
meeting of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. He called for clearer, more straightforward
accounting rules, saying it would benefit investors, public companies and accountants. "Plain English is just as
important in accountancy," he said.
Cox went on to discuss auditor concentration and the fact that the Big Four handle the vast majority of publiccompany audits. He stated that such "intense concentration" isn't desirable. He added that regulators need to
consider whether their rules are inhibiting competition in the field.
Furthermore, at a conference of auditing and accounting professionals in December 2004, the existence of a
dwindling number of accounting firms even raised concerns among European Union regulators. "This is a very
dangerous situation," said Alexander Schaub, Director General of the European Union Internal Markets
Commission. "With just four big auditors remaining, you can't guarantee that companies find auditors that aren't

already auditing their main competitors. You could introduce strict requirements on conflict of interest," Schaub
added. "But in my view, the best solution would be for the market to find its own way."
The topic of auditor concentration was also addressed in May 2005, when a group of 53 men and women - including
leaders from the regulatory, accounting, financial, legal, academic, investment banking and journalistic arenas, as
well as corporate board members and audit committee chairs - gathered at The University Club in New York City
for an American Assembly meeting. During the meeting, most aspects of the current audit environment were
discussed, including the actual degree of auditor concentration, whether more competition should be encouraged,
how to prevent increased concentration, as well as steps to ensure the continued stability and vibrancy of the
accounting profession. As summarized from its published report, The Future of the Accounting Profession: Auditor
Concentration, meeting attendees found as follows:
- The four largest accounting firms may be able to meet the needs of the largest U.S. companies, but the loss of one
of these firms would create an intolerable situation.
"The current degree of concentration in the profession raises the specter that the collapse of a Big Four
firm would be a threat to the continued existence of the profession. An audit environment with only
three large firms may be too small a number to maintain audit quality and independence, and any event
that causes another firm's collapse would automatically call into question the viability of the survivors."
- The current level of auditor concentration is only a problem for companies that believe they must use a Big Four
firm, without knowing that other firms are capable of serving all but the largest public companies:
"Practically all those present expressed the belief that mid-tier firms could satisfactorily serve a large
number of those companies that seem to be principally served by the Big Four."
- There are artificial and real barriers preventing mid-tier firms from increasing their market share. Misperceptions
among market influencers are one factor, but participants within these user groups conceded such perceptions are to
some extent unwarranted.

The slowly-changing audit landscape and what more can be done
The good news is that things are slowly changing in the independent audit arena, as companies, boards, audit
committees and external auditors have begun to re-examine their relationships with one another. This progress is
validated by the number of SEC-announced auditor changes from a Big Four firm to another global, national,
regional or local firm from 280 changes in 2003 to 421 in 2004 and 414 in 2005.
At Grant Thornton, we attribute much of this movement to the belief that when organizations examine their current
auditor relationship, they realize that they can be served as well - and in some cases better - by a non-Big Four firm
targeted to their market segment or industry. The secret these companies have learned is "right sizing" - matching
company size and requirements with a firm's size and capabilities to find the best fit.
Consider the case of Audiovox. In October 2003, pursuant to the recommendation of its audit committee and its
board of directors, Audiovox appointed Grant Thornton LLP as its independent auditor, replacing Big Four firm
KPMG LLP. In commenting on the company's switch to Grant Thornton, John Shalam, Audiovox CFO, noted Grant
Thornton's ability to perform the same work as their former Big Four provider:
"In this complex world of controls, finance and accounting, Grant Thornton helps us address these
issues. I can tell you, that after working with a Big Four firm for 20 years, they do not have the corner
on technical expertise. The technical skills from our Grant Thornton team are exceptional. We have
worldwide businesses and whether it's in Germany, Venezuela, Malaysia or China, Grant Thornton has
the global reach to assist us in these countries. The international service teams run smoothly and again there is never a question about technical know-how."

Right sizing is not only about cost or technical expertise. It's also about service and attention, communication and
responsiveness. Companies owe it to themselves and their investors to evaluate an array of qualified global, national,
regional and even local firms to ensure they are receiving the best combination of quality, service, value and reach to
meet their needs. It's good governance, and it's good business for companies to seek better service.

Grant Thornton's five steps
However, as much as right sizing is the responsibility of the company to reassess and do their homework, it is also
the responsibility of others in the capital markets. Investment and commercial bankers, lawyers, insurers, analysts,
rating agencies and other opinion leaders should not limit public company auditor choices to just the Big Four. With
this in mind, Grant Thornton has developed five steps for increasing company choice and auditor competition, an
initiative led by Mr. Cono Fusco, Grant Thornton LLP Managing Partner of Strategic Relationships, as follows:
1. The SEC and our nation's stock exchanges should encourage, as a best practice, that public companies conduct a
periodic review of their audit firm choices to be sure they are getting the best combination of quality, service, value
and reach.
It should be noted that Grant Thornton is not advocating mandatory auditor rotation in which companies would be
required to change auditors even if they are already working with the firm best suited to meet their needs. But, as a
matter of good governance and good business, Grant Thornton believes that companies should be encouraged to
periodically evaluate their audit firm choices to ensure they are getting the best combination of quality, service,
value and reach from their external audit firm.
Encouraging the periodic review of auditor choices as a best practice is consistent with Grant Thornton's belief in
free market solutions, as opposed to more drastic, regulation-based proposals, such as breaking up the Big Four or
placing limits on a firm's market share. Both of these latter proposals place artificial constraints on the competitive
landscape and limit company choice.
It should be further noted that The Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise, as part of
their Best Practice Suggestions, also called for periodic review of audit firm choices. According to the official report
issued in 2003, companies should evaluate their external audit firm on an annual basis and conduct a more thorough
review - giving serious consideration to alternative firms - every five to seven years.
Some firms may find it difficult to change auditors if they have employed separate firms for their audit, tax and
consulting work. Therein, if they want to change their current auditor, they would then have to change multiple
service providers to avoid any independence issues. This issue is a difficult and potentially expensive one. As a
result, we believe this issue should be noted and addressed by regulatory bodies.
2. Public company boards and audit committees, in this changed audit environment, should "right-size" their audit
firm by matching company size, complexity and requirements with firm size and capabilities.
In matching company size and requirements with firm size and capabilities, companies may very well reaffirm their
decision to continue working with their current audit firm. But they may also find that another firm could combine
the same or better technical expertise with service, attention and market or industry expertise for a better fit.
3. Companies and other capital markets influencers - including investors, analysts, commercial and investment
bankers, and attorneys - should open the door to more audit firm choices. There are more than four audit firms
capable of serving public companies, but misperceptions in the capital markets on occasion pre-empt company
choices. Some underwriters encourage companies planning an IPO to use a Big Four firm. Limiting auditor choice
in this way is prohibitive in that it:
pre-emits or vetoes the Sarbanes-Oxley mandated responsibilities of audit committees to select company auditors,
stifles competition with a potentially negative impact on service, value, innovation and quality, and

further exacerbates the limited choices companies face in selecting new auditors.
An integral part of this process includes updating auditor change disclosure requirements, which for three decades
have helped fuel the negative perception that organizations change auditors in order to gain a more favorable
opinion or escape a problem. This issue first began in the 1970s with the creation of a system for reporting auditor
changes through 8-K filings, and still persists today. It distorts assessments of analysts, ratings agencies, investors
and others involved in the capital markets.
It is not difficult to understand how negative perceptions of auditor changes developed. When first addressed by the
SEC as a means to curtail opinion shopping, Form 8-K filings were only required when there was a disagreement
between a company and its auditors. As a result, changes were continually associated with problems - real or
perceived - in a company's financial statements.
In 1988, the SEC updated these rules, requiring all companies to report auditor changes in 8-K filings, as well
whether or not there had been any one of four reportable events or any disagreements between a company and its
audit firm. (1) This updating expanded the auditor change disclosure requirements to include all auditor changes.
However, the only required disclosures surrounding the auditor change were negative disclosures, despite the fact
that there are some positive reasons for an auditor change, such as changing to work with a firm that specializes in
your industry or market segment, getting better service from your firm, or getting a better value for fees.
Accordingly, over time, an auditor change had become a false signal that problems may exist with a company's
financial statements. As a result, many companies are reluctant to change audit firms, even if they want to change
for the right reasons.
Luckily, some companies are listening, proactively addressing these misperceptions in the market by offering
reasons for auditor changes even in instances where the current rules do not require a stated reason. Eleven percent
more companies offered reasons for auditor changes in 2004 than in 2003, even though there was virtually no
change in the number of required disclosures of disagreements and reportable events.
Public acceptance of audit firm changes is improving. Nevertheless, the current 8-K rules must be reformed to
increase the level of transparency surrounding audit firm changes and to assure that communications between the
new audit firm and its predecessor firm allow for the highest standards of accountability. Accordingly, Grant
Thornton suggests the following changes to improve the disclosure process:
All public companies should be required to give a reason for an audit firm change, and all audit firms should be
required to document why they are resigning as auditors from a company or not standing for reappointment.
Successor auditors should also be given full access to all of the predecessor's working papers and accountants who
previously worked with the client. Full discussions and access could reduce the risk that a sensitive area is not given
appropriate attention by the successor.
4. The PCAOB and the audit profession should share and coordinate best practices for the audit process, including
audit procedures, evaluation of fraud risk and possibly audit software. All firms should periodically assess whether
or not they have the requisite attributes to serve specific clients.
Sharing best practices among the leading audit firms would significantly enhance audit effectiveness and increase
public confidence in quality audits. Grant Thornton also believes that the best audits are completed when companies
and audit firms are appropriately matched. Accordingly, just as companies should periodically evaluate firm choices,
auditors should evaluate their resources in relation to client needs to determine if they are still appropriately matched
in terms of size and service capabilities.
For the largest firms, this may mean resigning from certain clients in order to reallocate resources to serve the
largest clients. For smaller firms, this may be an opportunity to recognize that certain clients have grown beyond
their capabilities or have entered industries in which the firm is not experienced.

5. A debate and discussion on the topic of auditor liability exposure should begin.

American Assembly findings
In addition to Grant Thornton's efforts, the American Assembly meeting and report also produced a number of
observations for improving auditor consolidation and competition, as follows:
Audit committees should reconsider the performance of their external auditors at regular intervals. This will
provide non-Big-Four audit firms with more opportunities to compete for clients of the Big Four.
Non-Big Four firms should consider performing outreach to audit committee chairs, attorneys and investment
bankers who work on IPOs, as well as to members of the Big Four who help companies consider alternatives when
they end client relationships. Such involvement could improve the chances that a Big Four firm would advise a
former client to consider a non-Big Four firm.
As more firms either outsource their internal audit function or use an external auditor to bolster their own internal
audit department, non-Big Four firms may have more opportunities to become associated with the larger clients of
the Big Four. The fact that a smaller firm may not have the capacity to conduct an audit of a multibillion dollar
international corporation does not mean that the same firm could not assist the internal audit function.
More non-Big Four firm representatives should be invited to participate in debates concerning new regulations and
reforms.
Analysts, credit rating agencies, investment bankers and lawyers should not be as authoritative as they appear to
be in persuading their clients not to use non-Big Four firms.

White House meeting
Following the American Assembly meeting, the President's Council of Economic Advisors Chief of Staff also held a
roundtable in the fall of 2005 to discuss the topic of auditor concentration. Participants of the meeting included the
AICPA, Grant Thornton, BDO Seidman, McGladrey & Pullen, Crowe Chizek, Eisner & Co., Plante & Moran and
Moss Adams.
At the meeting, it was noted that today more public companies are audited by non-Big Four firms than prior to
Sarbanes-Oxley; however, the lack of auditor choice by the largest of public companies continues to be a public
policy concern. Four major concepts were discussed as possible means of correcting this issue and increasing auditor
choice, as follows:
1. Competition forces related to conflicts--Some companies face real or perceived conflicts of interest with their Big
Four auditors because the Big Four firm provides non-audit defined services in addition to performing the audit .
This could be improved by having more firms perform non-audit services, thereby keeping a maximum number of
Big Four firms not conflicted and thus able to compete for audit work.
2. Liability reform--Liability claims in those firms below the Big Four have made insurance less available, thus
making it more difficult for smaller firms to move up market. This liability issue could be addressed in many ways,
including: regulatory preemptions, proportionate legislative caps, minimization of vicarious liability and
proportionate liability as opposed to joint and several liability.
3. Marketplace permissions/messages--To enhance the likelihood of public companies using non-Big Four firms, it
is important for key policy makers to recognize the depth of quality that exists in the firms below the Big Four firms.
Policy makers at the highest levels should embrace non-Big Four firms by including them in policy discussions and
on appropriate councils and committees, by speaking of the profession more broadly than just in terms of the Big
Four firms, and by encouraging market leaders to be more receptive to using non-Big Four firms. In addition, policy
makers should encourage audit committee members to look at the profession more broadly.

IPOs
In particular, greater policy-maker support would be advantageous to non-Big Four firms during the IPO process. As
of the two-year period that ended Sept. 30, 2005, 85 percent of all IPOs had Big Four firms as their auditors. Many
of these companies were former clients of non-Big Four firms; however, in the process of becoming a public entity,
they were encouraged to switch to a Big Four firm as a perceived risk mitigation strategy by underwriters or Wall
Street advisors.
Audit committee risk
Today, audit committees are empowered to hire auditors and other firms for non-audit services. However, due to the
high amount of risk considerations, audit committees often select Big Four firms because they believe that the
choice of a Big Four firm is less likely to be second guessed in the event of negative future problems. Audit
committees are empowered to hire other firms. While they may feel that a non-Big Four firm has the best needs of
the company.
Regulatory inspections
In addition, regulatory bodies must also be certain that inspections and enforcement activities are not biased toward
a Big Four approach. Regulators must address this issue and inform audit committees that non-Big Four firms might
approach audit work in a different, but equally acceptable, if not better way.
4. Access to greater capital
Capital is a necessary element for a non-Big Four firm in building international networks, advancing technology and
expanding other competencies in an effort to serve larger public companies. Unfortunately for these firms, current
forms of practice rules, some rooted in state law, minimize capital raising opportunities. Greater access to capital
through more innovative structures other than essentially partnership structures could fuel growth and competition
among the smaller accounting firms.

Conclusion
Companies, boards, regulators and other market influencers are becoming more aware of the current audit
environment. To some extent, the discussion of those challenges facing the accounting profession is beginning to
intensify - particularly as it relates to capacity and liability concerns.
Perhaps over time, market forces alone could lead to greater auditor diversification and reduce the systemic risk of
auditor concentration. But "over time" is too long to wait and simply too risky.
The fact is, no one group or action will be able to effectively address all the challenges our profession - and our
markets - now face. Rather, it is the responsibility of the collective capital markets to affect change. With this in
mind, Grant Thornton urges all parties involved in the audit process and financial reporting to embrace the realities
of auditor concentration and examine all possibilities to improve audit firm competition. The future of our financial
markets may depend on it.

Footnote
(1)The four reportable events pursuant to Item 304 of Regulation S-K areas follow:
(1)Internal controls necessry for reliable financial statements do not exist.
(2)The auditor no longer is able to rely on management representations.
(3)Serious audit scope problems have arisen.

(4)An unresolved financial reporting issue.

